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Since March 2013, three waves of human infection with avi-
an influenza A(H7N9) virus have been detected in China. To 
investigate virus transmission within and across epidemic 
waves, we used surveillance data and whole-genome anal-
ysis of viruses sampled in Guangdong during 2013–2015. 
We observed a geographic shift of human A(H7N9) infec-
tions from the second to the third waves. Live poultry market 
interventions were undertaken in epicenter cities; however, 
spatial phylogenetic analysis indicated that the third-wave 
outbreaks in central Guangdong most likely resulted from 
local virus persistence rather than introduction from else-
where. Although the number of clinical cases in humans de-
clined by 35% from the second to the third waves, the genet-
ic diversity of third-wave viruses in Guangdong increased. 
Our results highlight the epidemic risk to a region reporting 
comparatively few A(H7N9) cases. Moreover, our results 
suggest that live-poultry market interventions cannot com-
pletely halt A(H7N9) virus persistence and dissemination.
Since its first notification on March 30, 2013 (1), avian influenza A(H7N9) virus caused 3 complete epidemic 
waves of human infection in China, comprising 670 labora-
tory-confirmed clinical cases and 274 deaths as of Decem-
ber 28, 2015 (http://www.wpro.who.int/outbreaks_emer-
gencies/H7N9/en/). Despite the accumulating number of 
human cases, how this virus disseminated and transmitted 
across the 3 epidemic waves is not yet understood.
Direct or indirect prior exposure to live poultry or 
poultry-related environments is the major risk for A(H7N9) 
infection in humans (2,3). In response to the A(H7N9) out-
break, major efforts were undertaken to temporarily close 
and sanitize live poultry markets (LPMs) in epicenter cit-
ies during epidemics (4–6). These interventions are thought 
to temporarily decrease A(H7N9) contamination of LPM 
environmental samples (4,6) and to reduce the incidence 
of clinical infection (3,6). However, whether these viruses 
persist locally across epidemic waves despite current inter-
ventions has yet to be answered.
Guangdong Province in southern China accounts for 
≈10% of China’s domestic poultry industry and is thought 
to be an important epicenter of influenza A virus circulation 
(7). The province reported no clinical cases during the first 
wave of A(H7N9) infection but represented the epicenter 
of the second and third epidemic waves. We integrated epi-
demiologic, spatial, and genetic data to trace the temporal 
and spatial origins of influenza A(H7N9) in humans during 
2013–2015 in Guangdong.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The institutional ethics committee of the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention of Guangdong Province (Guang-
dong CDC) approved this study. Written consent was 
signed by patients or their guardian(s) when samples were 
collected. Patients were informed about the study before 
providing their written consent, and the data were anony-
mized for analysis.
Influenza A(H7N9)Surveillance and Sequencing
Since the first A(H7N9) case in late March 2013, an en-
hanced provincial surveillance program in all 21 prefec-
ture-level cities in Guangdong has been conducted by a 
total of 871 clinics and 21 local centers for disease control. 
All specimens from persons with suspected A(H7N9) in-
fections were tested for subtypes H5, H7, and H9 as previ-
ously described (8,9).
In April 2013, Guangdong CDC launched an environ-
mental surveillance program to monitor avian influenza 
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viruses in LPMs (9). Environmental samples were col-
lected from LPMs in Guangdong Province during April 
15, 2013–May 30, 2015 (8–10). Ten to 20 environmental 
samples per market were collected from selected markets 
in 21 prefecture-level cities. When A(H7N9) infection was 
confirmed in a person in a given location and that person 
had exposure to a specific LPM, at least 20 environmental 
samples were collected from that market within 24 hours 
after confirmation of human infection.
Upon reverse transcription PCR testing, H7N9- and 
H9N2-positive swab materials and sputum samples from 
patients and LPM environments were blindly passaged for 
2–3 generations in 9- to 10-day-old embryonated chicken 
eggs for virus isolation. All 8 segments of the selected iso-
lates were sequenced by using a next-generation sequenc-
ing strategy for influenza A virus with the Ion PGM System 
and PathAmpFluA Reagents (Life Technologies, Carlsbad, 
CA, USA). Specific primer sets were used to amplify and 
fill potential gaps (8,9).
Sequence Alignment and Maximum-Likelihood  
Phylogenetic Analysis
A total of 1,124 nt sequences were generated by this 
study. These sequences were combined with all publicly 
available complete gene sequences of influenza A viruses 
with known sampling dates and locations that belong to 
subtypes H7N9, H9N2, and other closely related sub-
types. Multiple sequence alignment was performed by us-
ing ClustalW (11), and alignments were minimally edited 
by using Aliview (12). Maximum-likelihood trees were 
estimated for all 8 gene segments (hemagglutinin [HA], n 
= 865; neuraminidase [NA], n = 788; nucleoprotein [NP], 
n = 1,879; basic polymerase proteins 1 and 2 [PB1 and 
PB2], n = 1,773 and n = 1,826, respectively; polymerase, 
n = 1,839; matrix, n = 1,841; and nonstructural [NS], n = 
838) in RaxML (13) by using the generalized time-revers-
ible nucleotide substitution model with gamma -distribu-
tion among site rate heterogeneity (14). For each gene 
dataset, we assessed temporal accumulation of genetic di-
vergence from the root-to-tip from maximum-likelihood 
midpoint-rooted phylogenies using TempEst (formerly 
Path-O-Gen) (15).
Dated Phylogenetic Analysis
To infer dated phylogenetic trees in a reasonable com-
putational time, we reduced the size of our datasets by 
removing identical sequences collected in the same 
sampling locations on the same date. We also removed 
H9N2 sequences that were phylogenetically unrelated 
to the H7N9 sequences in our study but kept all H7N9 
sequences from clinical cases in Guangdong. Bayesian 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) inferences were 
undertaken by using BEAST, using a SRD06 nucleotide 
substitution model (16), a relaxed molecular clock model 
with an uncorrelated lognormal rate distribution (17), 
and a Bayesian skygrid coalescent model (18). Four in-
dependent MCMC runs of 1 × 108 steps were computed 
and ≈10%–15% burn-in was discarded, resulting in ≈3.5 
× 108 total steps for each gene dataset. Parameters and 
trees were sampled every 35,000th and 70,000th MCMC 
step, respectively. Convergence of MCMC chains was in-
spected by using Tracer version 1.6 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.
uk). A subset of 500 trees was drawn randomly from the 
combined posterior distribution of trees and used as an 
empirical distribution for subsequent analysis (19).
Spatial and Temporal Origins of H7N9
We used a Bayesian discrete phylogeographic approach to 
investigate spatial dynamics among 9 geographic regions. 
Specifically, we considered viral movement across east-
ern China (Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shandong 
provinces); central China (Jiangxi and Hunan provinces); 
northern China (Beijing, Henan, Hebei, and Xinjiang 
provinces); southeastern China (Fujian Province); cen-
tral Guangdong Province (Guangzhou, Huizhou, Foshan, 
Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, Jiangmen, and Zhao-
qing Figure 1]); eastern Guangdong Province (Meizhou, 
Heyuan, Chaozhou, Jieyang, Shantou, and Shanwei); 
western Guangdong Province (Yangjiang, Maoming, and 
Yunfu); and other regions (related sequences isolated from 
other countries before the H7N9 epidemic). To trace the 
origin of H7N9 infection, we considered sporadic clinical 
infection cases from Malaysia and Taiwan as a separate 
discrete location. Hong Kong adjoins central Guangdong, 
and most imported live poultry in Hong Kong is from cen-
tral Guangdong (Zhuhai and Shenzhen). Therefore, Hong 
Kong and central Guangdong were considered as a single 
spatial unit. To provide a more realistic reconstruction 
that includes the directionality of virus transmission, we 
used an asymmetric continuous-time Markov chain model 
(20) to estimate ancestral locations and location posterior 
probabilities for each node in the dated phylogenies. Fi-
nally, we used TreeAnnotator to obtain maximum clade 
credibility trees for each gene, which were visualized 
by using FigTree version 1.4.2 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk). 
Nucleotide sequences generated in this study were sub-
mitted to GISAID (Global Initiative on Sharing All In-
fluenza Data, http://www.gisaid.org) under accession nos. 
EPI655863–EPI656506 and EPI654015–EPI654495.
Results
An Epicenter Shift of A(H7N9) in Humans,  
Guangdong, 2013–2015
As of October 14, 2015, a total of 182 laboratory-con-
firmed clinical cases of A(H7N9) infection in humans and 
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68 deaths were reported in Guangdong (Figure 1; online 
Technical Appendix Table 1, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/22/12/16-0450-Techapp1.pdf). Guangdong reported 
no clinical A(H7N9) cases during the first epidemic wave 
(March 2013–May 2013) but had the highest number of 
cases during the second (110 cases during June 2013–May 
2014) and third (72 cases during June 2014–May 2015) 
epidemic waves.
Unexpectedly, the geographic distributions of 
A(H7N9) cases in Guangdong differed during the second 
and third waves (Figure 1, panels B, C). During the sec-
ond wave, 110 cases were reported from 14 prefecture-
level cities in Guangdong. The epicenter of the outbreak 
was in central Guangdong in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) 
region (95 [86%] cases). The highest numbers of human 
cases were reported from cities in Guangdong that had the 
most LPMs and the highest population density, such as 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Foshan (Figure 1, panel A). 
Citywide LPM closures of 2 weeks’ duration were imple-
mented in Guangzhou and Shenzhen cities in February 
2014, during the middle of the second wave, and were 
extended to all prefecture-level cities in central Guang-
dong in January 2015 during the middle of the third wave 
(Figure 1, panel B; online Technical Appendix Table 
2). All live poultry were removed, and LPM were disin-
fected once; the markets were cleaned thoroughly with 
0.05%–0.1% diluted chlorine solution after poultry re-
moval. Short-term surveillance showed that the A(H7N9) 
detection rate decreased from 14.83% (112/755) before 
LPM closure to 1.67% (5/300) on the day when markets 
reopened, across 31 sampled markets during the second 
wave (4). Another study found that avian influenza vi-
rus contamination in LPMs dropped precipitously after 
cleaning and disinfecting (21). Our clinical surveillance 
data showed that human cases reduced by 55% (online 
Technical Appendix Table 1) in central Guangdong dur-
ing the third wave but rose in other regions of Guang-
dong; eastern Guangdong became a new epicenter of the 
outbreak. Twenty-eight human cases occurred in eastern 
Guangdong during the first 2 months of 2015, compared 
with only 2 during the same period in 2014 (Figure 1). 
The geographic shift of A(H7N9) infection between the 
second and third waves became more apparent when in-
cidence per capita was measured (Figure 1, panel C) be-
cause eastern Guangdong has a lower average population 
density than the PRD region.
Figure 1. Avian influenza A(H7N9) infection in humans, Guangdong, China, 2013–2015. A) Geographic distribution of H7N9 in humans 
during the second (June 2013–May 2014) and third (June 2014–May 2015) waves. Confirmed cases in humans identified during 
the second wave are marked with circles and during the third wave with triangles. H7N9 isolates newly sequenced in this study are 
highlighted in red. Pink and green shading indicates city prefectures in central and eastern Guangdong Province, respectively. B) 
Numbers of human H7N9 infections in different regions of Guangdong Province during 2013–2015. Arrows indicate the dates at which 
live-poultry markets were closed in epicenter cities. No infections were reported during April–October. C) Incidence (human H7N9 
infections/1 million population) in each region.
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Epidemic Origins of Human A(H7N9) Infections  
in Guangdong
We undertook a phylogenetic molecular clock analysis to 
identify the epidemic origins and transmission dynamics of 
circulating avian influenza A strains during the third wave. 
The H7N9 sequences included in our analyses represented 
55% (60/110) and 49% (35/72) of all diagnosed H7N9 cases 
in Guangdong during the second and third waves, respec-
tively. H7N9 and H9N2 viruses obtained from poultry and 
LPM environmental samples during 2013–2015 also were 
sequenced, resulting in 44 complete and 79 incomplete virus 
genomes generated using high-throughput sequencing (8,9).
Phylogeographic analysis of 433 H7 HA genes revealed 
spatial patterns of A(H7N9) transmission across China (Fig-
ure 2, panel A). During the first epidemic wave, A(H7N9) 
virus spread from eastern China to northern, central, 
and southeastern China, causing a few human infections 
(Figure 2, panel A), consistent with previous analyses 
Figure 2. A) Bayesian maximum clade credibility molecular clock tree of influenza virus H7 gene sequences. Branch colors represent 
the most probable ancestral locations of each branch, inferred from using a spatial phylogenetic model (see Materials and Methods for 
details). Three major clades of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus were nominated, and phylogenetic posterior probability support is shown 
for selected clades. B, C) Phylogenies showing hemagglutinin, Guangdong, China, third-wave clades. Phylogenetic posterior probability 
support is shown for selected clades.
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(22,23). All A(H7N9) viruses identified from chicken and 
environmental samples in Guangdong during the first wave 
were derived from viruses circulating in eastern China 
(Figure 2, panel A). These Guangdong viruses fell into 2 
distinct phylogenetic clusters, indicating multiple indepen-
dent introductions to the region, possibly through different 
poultry trade routes.
During the second epidemic wave, local transmission 
and proliferation of A(H7N9) virus was detected in Guang-
dong, particularly in central Guangdong. The HA phylog-
eny indicated that 94% of A(H7N9) from clinical cases and 
92% of H7 subtypes from LPM environmental samples in 
Guangdong during the second wave clustered into 1 large 
clade, designated here as Central_GD_W2 (Figure 2, panel 
A; Figure 3). The earliest second wave case in this clade 
was sampled in August 2013 (A_GD-HZ_1_H7N9_2013; 
Figure 2, panel A). Our analysis suggested that viruses 
related to A_GD-HZ_1_H7N9_2013 persisted in and dis-
seminated through central Guangdong, giving rise to a 
large number of A(H7N9) cases in the region during the 
second wave. Moreover, we found that Central_GD_W2 
clade viruses also disseminated from central to eastern and 
western Guangdong during the second wave and caused 
human cases (e.g., A_GD-HY_138_2014) (Figure 2, pan-
els A, B). Four isolates from humans in Hong Kong and 
1 from a human in Malaysia during the second wave also 
fell within this clade (Figure 2, panel B). The phylogeny of 
N9 NA sequences displayed similar virus transmission pat-
terns (online Technical Appendix Figure, panel A). Most 
(73%) N9 genes from A(H7N9) isolates in Guangdong 
during the second wave clustered within the Central_GD_
W2 clade. In contrast to HA, the NA phylogeny showed 
that A(H7N9) isolates during the second wave in central 
Guangdong did not form a single cluster (online Technical 
Appendix Figure, panel A). However, fewer human cases 
(27%) were caused by these viruses, and most cases were 
limited to Shenzhen and Shantou cities, suggesting less 
transmission of viruses in this clade (online Technical Ap-
pendix Figure, panel A).
The incidence of A(H7N9) in humans in central 
Guangdong decreased by 55% during the third wave (Fig-
ure 1, panel B; online Technical Appendix Table 1). How-
ever, phylogenetic analysis indicated that the virus persist-
ed in central Guangdong. The H7 phylogeny showed that 
all A(H7N9) viruses from central Guangdong during the 
third wave were descended from Central_GD_W2 clade 
viruses of the second wave (Figure 2, panel B). The out-
breaks of A(H7N9) in humans in Fujian Province (south-
eastern China) during the third wave also were caused by 
Central_GD_W2 clade viruses, suggesting a possible trans-
mission of A(H7N9) virus from central Guangdong to cit-
ies in southeastern China during the second wave.
A major feature during the third epidemic wave 
was an increase in A(H7N9) cases in humans in eastern 
Guangdong (Figure 1, panels B, C; online Technical Ap-
pendix Table 1). Most (94%) isolates identified in eastern 
Guangdong during the third wave clustered into a single 
subclade of Eastern_CHN_W2 clade viruses in both the 
H7 and N9 phylogenies (Figure 2, panel C; online Tech-
nical Appendix Figure, panel A). The Eastern_CHN_W2 
clade viruses were mainly found in poultry from central 
China during the second wave but became predominant 
(among both poultry and humans) in eastern China and 
eastern Guangdong during the third wave (Figure 2, pan-
el C). Moreover, these viruses formed location-specific 
clades during the third wave, suggesting that they have 
become established and enzootic to the poultry popula-
tions in each locality (Figure 2, panel C).
Genetic Diversities of A(H7N9) Virus in Guangdong
During the second wave, sequences from 4 internal genes 
(NP, NS, PB1, PB2) of A(H7N9) isolates from central 
Guangdong mostly clustered into a single major clade, to-
gether with local A(H9N2) strains; these sequences were 
distinct from the A(H7N9) sequences from central or east-
ern China (Figure 4, panel A; online Technical Appen-
dix Figure, panels B, D, F) (8,22). However, by the third 
wave, most A(H7N9) viruses from central Guangdong had 
Figure 3. Genotypic analysis of influenza A(H7N9) viruses. Proposed genotypes are shown for 68 fully sequenced A(H7N9) viruses 
isolated from humans in central Guangdong during 2013–2015. Each square represents a gene sequence, and its color indicates the 
most probable clade to which that sequence belongs, as inferred from the phylogenies in Figures 2 and 4 and online Technical Appendix 
Figure, panels B–F (http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/22/12/16-0450-Techapp1.pdf).
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acquired some internal genes from viruses from central or 
eastern China. In particular, PB1, PB2, NP, and NS se-
quences obtained from humans with A(H7N9) infection 
and from H7N9/H9N2 environmental samples in central 
Guangdong during the third wave were distinct from those 
from the second wave (Figure 4, panel A; online Techni-
cal Appendix Figure, panels B, D, F). For instance, analy-
sis of the PB2 gene revealed that 65 of 69 viruses from 
clinical samples clustered into the Central_GD_W2 clade 
during the second wave. However, during the third wave, 
only 8 of 32 H7N9 viruses from clinical isolates fell into 
this group. The remaining 24 H7N9 isolates were phylo-
genetically related to H7N9 or H9N2 isolates from central 
or eastern China. It therefore appears that >70% of third-
wave H7N9 viruses from central Guangdong acquired a 
PB2 gene through reassortment with strains circulating 
elsewhere. A similar pattern also was observed for H7N9 
and H9N2 isolates from LPM environments (Figure 4). 
These findings supported the hypothesis that H9N2 virus-
es previously circulating outside Guangdong were intro-
duced into central Guangdong during the third wave and 
increased the diversity of internal genes of H7N9 in this 
place by reassortment.
We further classified all human A(H7N9) isolates 
from central Guangdong according to the phylogenetic 
placement of their genome segments. Genome segments 
of second-wave A(H7N9) from central Guangdong were 
typically co-inherited (except polymerase) and belonged to 
the Central_GD_W2 clade (Figure 3; Figure 4, panel A; 
online Technical Appendix Figure). A total of 12 different 
Figure 4. A) Bayesian maximum clade credibility phylogeographic tree of influenza virus polymerase protein 2 gene sequences. Branch 
colors represent the most probable ancestral locations of each branch, inferred from using a spatial phylogenetic model (see Materials 
and Methods for details). B–E) Phylogenies showing selected PB2 Guangdong third-wave clades. Empty squares indicate A(H9N2) 
virus sequences.
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lineages were observed in 55 human A(H7N9) viruses iso-
lated during the second wave in central Guangdong. This 
pattern was absent during the third wave; instead, the ge-
nomic structures of human A(H7N9) viruses were highly 
variable, with the exception of the HA and NA segments, 
which retained their association with the Central_GD_W2 
clade (Figure 3).
In contrast, phylogenetic reconstruction of PB1, PB2, 
NP, and NS sequences indicated that most third-wave se-
quences seen in eastern Guangdong were genetically simi-
lar (Figure 4, panel B; online Technical Appendix Figure, 
panels. B–F). These sequences grouped into a single clade, 
whereas those sampled in central Guangdong were phylo-
genetically dispersed.
Discussion
We analyzed epidemiologic data pertaining to influenza 
A(H7N9) virus in humans and virus sequence data from 
52% (95/182) of all persons in whom A(H7N9) infection 
was diagnosed and from LPMs environment samples dur-
ing 2013–2015 to characterize the origin and transmission 
of A(H7N9) in humans across epidemic waves in Guang-
dong. The phylogeographic analyses of HA and NA indi-
cate that the virus strain that caused third-wave outbreaks 
in central Guangdong descend from second-wave viruses 
that circulated in the same region. In other words, H7N9 
circulating during the second wave probably persisted in 
targeted cities and/or their neighboring areas until the third 
epidemic wave.
In contrast, the histories of the H7N9 internal genes, 
which are affected by frequent reassortment with preva-
lent H9N2 viruses, most likely mirror the trade routes of 
live poultry. We found that A(H7N9) viruses from central 
Guangdong during the second wave possessed 5 (PB2, 
PB1, matrix, NP, NS) of 6 internal genes mainly from 
the Central_GD_W2 clade. However, in the third wave, 
viral internal genes were dispersed in phylogenetic trees; 
most strains fell into the Eastern_CHN1 or Eastern_CHN2 
clades, suggesting another source for the parental viruses 
of these reassortants (Figure 3). This finding suggests there 
were changes in nature of A(H9N2) viruses that were co-
circulating in central Guangdong (Figure 4, panel C; online 
Technical Appendix Figures B–F). Our data indicate that 
the genetic diversity of H7N9 or H9N2 in central Guang-
dong increased during the third wave, even though the 
number of human infections was lower in this region.
From a public health standpoint, our results under-
score 3 major concerns with current A(H7N9) infections 
in humans in China. First, the persistence and spread of 
A(H7N9) have not been completely constrained. A(H7N9) 
circulating in central Guangdong during the second wave 
was persistent and caused outbreaks in humans during 
the third wave. For example, 5 and 3 cases, respectively, 
were identified in humans in March 2014 in Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou in Guangdong after the reopening of LPMs in 
February 2014 (online Technical Appendix Tables 1, 2). 
This finding suggests that interventions such as the tem-
porary closure and sanitation of LPMs can reduce virus 
contamination in poultry and environmental samples but 
apparently cannot eliminate the risk for human infection 
(21). Recent long-term LPM surveillance in Guangzhou 
suggests that different types of poultry markets were recon-
taminated by A(H7N9) and other avian influenza A strains; 
up to 2 days after markets were reopened, detection rates 
of the viruses in LPM environments were as high as those 
before market closure (5).
Second, a geographic shift of the epicenter of human 
infections between the second and third waves in Guang-
dong suggests an epidemic of A(H7N9) infection is dif-
ficult to control solely by interfering in the epicenter of an 
outbreak. Some regions, once contaminated, might act as 
sources of infection to the wider poultry sector. Current 
sequence data suggest that the A(H7N9) human infections 
in eastern, northern, and southeastern China and eastern 
Guangdong during the third wave were mainly caused by 
viruses belonging to the Eastern_CHN_W2 clade, which 
were predominantly isolated from poultry populations in 
central China at the end of the second wave (Figure 2, panel 
C). In eastern Guangdong, 94% of A(H7N9) cases in hu-
mans during the third wave were caused by Eastern_CHN_
W2 clade viruses.
Third, other measures complementary to LPM clo-
sures should be considered by government administra-
tion. We observed a continued reassortment of Guangdong 
A(H7N9) lineages with viral strains from central and east-
ern China since February 2014 (Figures 3, 4), suggesting 
that live poultry from central and eastern areas might have 
been introduced into central Guangdong after the local 
LPMs were closed. Indeed, it is plausible that official clo-
sure led to an increase in illicit trading in some markets 
or neighborhoods (http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/html/2015-
03/18/content_2885023.htm; http://shenzhen.sina.com.cn/
news/n/2015-04-20/detail-iavxeafs5854802.shtml). In this 
context, the closure of central LPMs without a strict ban on 
the live poultry trade could, at least in theory, have detri-
mental effects. Illicit trading has the potential to change the 
poultry trade and make officially monitoring and control-
ling it more difficult. Other less disruptive measures that 
have been proven to reduce risk can be considered, such as 
rest days and banning live poultry overnight (24).
One limitation of this study is a lack of long-term sur-
veillance of live poultry in Guangdong. Such surveillance 
is difficult to implement because of a low infection rate and 
the absence of signs during A(H7N9) infection in poul-
try. However, most A(H7N9) infection in humans results 
from direct exposure to live poultry (25) (online Technical 
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Appendix Table 3). Furthermore, we used in our analyses 
environmental samples from LPMs, which partially reflect 
the circulation of avian influenza A strains in poultry. In 
addition, surveillance efforts in different regions might dif-
fer and could affect our interpretation on virus origin and 
transmission. In this study, we have analyzed most pub-
licly available, genetically related A(H7N9) sequences out 
of Guangdong Province, and the regions of eastern China 
and central Guangdong that reported most clinical H7N9 
cases represent most H7N9-related sequences. However, 
sampling bias cannot be excluded, especially for envi-
ronmental and poultry samples. Central China is a major 
poultry farming area but has a limited number of A(H7N9) 
sequences from poultry, which could be caused by a lower 
prevalence of the virus in this region or by a possible lim-
ited surveillance effort in poultry population. As a result, 
sequences data from Eastern_CHN_W2 clade are still lim-
ited to illustrate the evolution and transmission route of this 
clade of A(H7N9) (Figure 2, panel C). Longer-term and 
larger-scale studies are necessary to provide more robust 
evidence about the value of interventions for controlling 
the epidemic at national and regional scales.
During February 5–11, 2016, twenty-eight new 
A(H7N9)cases were reported in humans. Clearly, the 
public health risk from A(H7N9) remains. Our results 
highlight some limitations of the current geographically 
restricted LPM interventions on the epidemic control of 
A(H7N9), which might also apply to other avian influ-
enza viruses. To focus only on end-stage epidemic LPM 
interventions without including the entirety of the LPM 
transmission chain might, however, be of limited value. 
Public health organizations might wish to consider the 
possibility of proactively closing LPMs, and alternative 
measures as recently suggested (24), in areas potentially 
at-risk, although we recognize that practical, economic, 
and administrative considerations also contribute to deci-
sion-making processes.
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